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Abstract: Should intelligent agents and robots possess gender? If so, which gender and why? The authors explore one 
root of the gender-in-AI question from Turing’s introductory male-female imitation game, which matured to 
his famous Turing test examining machine thinking and measuring its intelligence against humans. What we 
find is gender is not clear cut and is a social construct. Nonetheless there are useful applications for gender-
cued intelligent agents, for example robots caring for elderly patients in their own home. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Ex Machina (Universal, 2014) features a 
cinematic full robot Turing test (Harnad and 
Scherzer, 2008). This is conducted between a male 
human and an artificial intelligence “housed in a 
beautiful female robot” not born of god or woman 
(Henry, 2014). The question posed in the film is not 
what the human feels about the AI, the question is 
how the female robot feels about the male human 
(Figure 1). We ask, are there instances when gender-
in-AI could be appropriate? The heart of this enquiry 
is founded in Alan Turing’s man-woman imitation 
game, which gave rise to his famous Turing test 
(Turing, 1950). 
 
Figure 1: Ex Machina: Female AI and male human Turing 
Test Judge (Universal Pictures) 
 
 
 
 
The authors posit that there are gendered 
applications for AI, for example in healthcare where 
‘gender attributed AI’ could be appropriate for robo-
carers (CompanionAble, 2012), or in virtual 
assistants (Artificial Solutions, 2015). We begin by 
reviewing the attitudes, opinions and assessments of 
the gender game.  
2 GENDER IN THE IMITATION 
GAME 
Performance in chess was Turing’s initial comparison 
measure for a machine player against a human player 
(Shah, 2010). In proposing his question-answer test 
Turing (1950) introduced the idea through a gender 
game (see Figure 2). In this game a human 
interrogator of either sex simultaneously questions 
two hidden interlocutors: one man and one woman. 
The purpose of the man is to pretend to be a woman; 
the woman’s task is to tell the truth. The interrogator 
must determine the actual woman. Replacing one of 
the hidden interlocutors with a machine Turing (1950: 
p. 435) asked: 
“May not machines carry out something 
which ought to be described as thinking 
but which is very different from what a 
man does?” 
Turing quite rightly raised that question realising 
after WWII that man does not think like every other 
 man; man does think like woman; an Occidental 
woman may not think like a woman from the Orient. 
Figure 2: Gender Imitation Game. 
 
 
 
Gender is regarded as an important feature in 
Turing’s game by some (Copeland & Proudfoot 2008; 
Sterrett, 2000; Lassègue, 1996; Hayes & Ford, 1995; 
Genova, 1994). The contention is that both man and 
machine impersonating a woman provides a stronger 
test for intelligence. However, neither of these 
researchers have explained what they mean by gender 
nor have they provided empirical evidence to 
substantiate their claim. 
2.1 Gender vs. Sex 
Turing did not term his man-woman imitation game a 
gender one, or his man-machine an artificial test 
When considering gender and whether it is relevant 
to agents’ development we face a number of salient 
questions. If we are developing intelligent agents to 
interact with, and support, humans ought we not to 
audit: 
 Whether sex and gender are the same thing? 
 Regardless of your ‘self and socially 
established’ gender do you remain the same sex 
you were born? 
 How many genders are there? 
 Can a human be one gender physically and 
another psychologically? 
 Should an AI have a sex: be given male or 
female genitals? 
 Do we build agents and robots genderless? 
 Do we innovate for human sensibilities? 
 Do we make assumptions about the gender of 
agent and robot developers? 
The gender spectrum (2015) includes: 
1. Cisgender: born as man or woman and identify 
as same in life, 
2. Inter: such as Hermaphrodite, could be due to 
presence of both male and female reproductive 
organs at birth, 
3. Transgender: crossed over after birth – for 
example, former American male Olympic 
athlete Bruce Jenner sex-changed to Caitlyn 
Jenner (IBT, 2015). 
For an understanding of gender in different 
cultures - Hijras in the Indian sub-continent identified 
as feminised males, see Newman (2002), or identity-
based determination of gender - when a person’s 
gender is authenticated by other people, see 
Westbrook (2013). Newman details Western 
interpretations of sex and gender: the former is the 
“biological status of a person as either male or female 
based on anatomical characteristics”, with the latter 
“used to refer to socially constructed roles and 
cultural representations” (2002, p. 353). Real life 
cases show the ambiguity and messiness in clearly 
defining sex or gender. The case of female South 
African runner Caster Semenya is one. Semenya was 
made to undergo gender tests to prove she was female 
following accusations of being male, “because she 
had elevated testosterone levels” (Telegraph, 2015).  
Was Turing quite naïve then, or perhaps 
mischievous? In drawing a distinction between men 
and women he attributed imitation game roles, 
possibly based on a belief that woman’s capacity is 
better for telling the truth and the man’s ability greater 
at pretence. 
2.2 Sex and Intellectual Capacity  
With the complexity involved in defining gender we 
turn to the assumptions about gender and intellectual 
capacity in the imitation game. According to 
Lassègue (1996) Turing’s method of explaining his 
simultaneous comparison game is ambiguous leading 
to confusion concerning the function of the machine. 
Lassègue (1996) interprets the role of the man in the 
game as attempting to deceive by imitating “the 
woman and the machine the two of them” (p.7). The 
confusion extends to an interpretation that the 
machine must imitate a man imitating a woman. 
Hayes and Ford (1995) see the machine in such a 
scenario as a “mechanical transvestite” (p. 973).  
Genova accepts “Turing never speaks directly 
about gender” (1994: p. 322). Turing’s topic of 
consideration was not ‘computing, gender and 
intelligence’, it was exploring the intellectual 
capacity of a machine (Shah, 2010). Genova believes 
Turing created more than just a machine-human 
comparison test. She believes Turing questioned the 
very nature of thinking and “how it should be 
measured” (1994: p. 313). Genova claims “the game 
centers on gender questions, not species ones ... 
whether it [the machine] can fool player C into 
 believing it is one kind of human rather than another, 
i.e. male not female” (p. 314). However, this is not 
borne out by Turing’s sample interrogator-witness 
interaction (1950: p.446): 
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick 
reminded you of a Christmas Day? 
Witness: In a Way. 
As evidence of gender significance, Genova 
points to the first instance when a machine becomes 
involved in Turing’s imitation game. Genova claims 
Turing’s radical idea charged “thinking be measured 
by gender miming” (1994: p. 315). Genova points to 
the initial participants in the man-woman game and 
how they were replaced. Turing evolved the 
introductory scenario with three participants - man 
(A), woman (B) and interrogator (C) with the 
intriguing question (1950:p. 434): 
 “what will happen when a machine takes 
the part of A [man] in this game?”  
Turing’s usual questions of “chess and logical 
games” were replaced with proposals to “measure 
thought by the commonplace and presumably ‘easy’ 
activity of being male or female” (Genova, 1994: p. 
315). Turing did pose gender questions initially: 
“length of hair” (1950: p. 433), but after the digital 
computer C was introduced into the game as player A 
(played by the man in Turing’s explanatory scenario), 
and the man moved to player B (played by the woman 
earlier), Turing used “specimen questions”, such as 
poetry and arithmetic, and intellectual games: “please 
write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge”; 
“Add 34957 to 70764” and “Do you play chess?” 
(1950: p.434).  
The succeeding hidden entities, man and machine, 
are again interrogated by a human player C who can 
be of either sex. Genova asked “why would he 
[Turing] be so careful about the gender assignments 
in laying out the game, i.e. A is a man, B is a woman?” 
(1994: p. 314). Genova overlooks that the man-
woman game was preparatory for the machine-human 
test. By the fourth unfolding of the three-participant 
imitation game for machine thinking Turing sets out 
the new participants as follows: 
player A = a digital computer (C);   
player B =  (hu)man;  
player C = human interrogator. 
2.2.1 Imitating a Woman 
Turing matured the gender discrimination scenario to 
an interrogation of a machine that is simultaneously 
compared against a human. Turing did not direct that 
the part of B, played by a woman in the male-female 
scenario, should be played by a man pretending to be 
a woman, Hayes and Ford’s interpretation (1995). 
Turing had opportunity to be explicit in his work 
before his death in 1954 had he intended the machine 
and the human both to imitate a woman in the 
machine-human comparison. Turing surely did not 
shy of scripting on other radical items, such as extra-
sensory perception and telepathy (1950: p. 453). 
Genova ignores where, anticipating the objection 
of consciousness in the machine (‘Argument 4’ in 
section 6: Contrary Views on the Main Question, 
1950), Turing referred to a two-participant scenario 
dispensing with the hidden male comparator 
altogether: “player B omitted” (p. 446) with the 
machine undergoing direct questioning by a human 
interrogator (Shah, 2013; Shah, 2011). Genova 
discounts Turing’s pointer to real-life one-to-one 
situations in interviewer/interviewee scenes, “under 
the name of viva voce to discover whether someone 
really understands something or has learnt it parrot 
fashion” (1950: p. 446).  Turing’s 1952 BBC radio 
discussion shows that he did not exclude women from 
acting as the interrogator of the machine ‘witness’ in 
his one-to-one test (Shah, 2013). 
2.3 Turing & Gender 
Genova (1994) states “computing accomplishes the 
miracle of creation” (p. 320), viewing the computer 
“as the ultimate kind of dynamic technology” (p. 
322). Turing’s personal life made it abhorrent for him 
to intimately participate in creating another intelligent 
being (Shah, 2014; Hodges, 1992), what Genova 
refers to as Turing’s “sexual dilemma” (1994: p. 317), 
so he conceived an alternative process bringing a 
thinking entity into the world, as opposed to the 
‘natural one’ (Henry, 2014). Genova concludes “in 
Turing’s brave new world, female machines are 
absent ... inability to keep his personal life out of his 
scientific one” (p. 324). Genova’s desire for female 
machines is pertinent, especially in the development 
of gendered robots having persuasive power in 
human-robot interaction (Siegel, Breazeal & Norton, 
2009) and the human disposition to assign a robot as 
a ‘he’, for example, in the case of NASA’s robot 
astronaut Robonaut (Dattaro, 2015) 
Genova’s question of why the female should tell 
the truth in the introductory man-woman imitation 
game marking “her as an inferior thinker” (1994: p. 
319), echoes Lassègue (1996) who sees it as an 
absence of strategy, the “odds are weighed too 
heavily against the woman” (p. 6). That the man’s 
task is to deceive exposes a view that deception 
requires being clever in a way that a woman may not 
 be, or, as Lassègue (1996) put it, to Turing there was 
a “secret connection between gender and 
intelligence” (p. 8). 
2.3.1 Female Impersonation 
Sterrett (2000) puts forward a test for machine 
intelligence that is more American-centric than 
anthropocentric. Her illustration involves knowledge 
of baseball, an American sport: “Three strikes and 
you’re out” (p.85). Sterrett interprets two distinct 
formulations in Turing’s imitation game, both focus 
on the three-participant test:  
i) An ‘original game’ featuring a computer 
or a man imitating a woman compared 
against a woman, and  
ii) The ‘standard test’ involving the 
determination of which is a machine and 
which is human.   
Sterrett does not provide empirical evidence for 
the supposition that her two tests yield different 
results after examining different competencies: “one 
employs a better characterization of intelligence” (p. 
79). Sterrett’s coalescence with the “revisionist line” 
(Piccinini, 2000: p. 112), provides no confirmation 
that both man and machine impersonating the fairer 
sex while the interrogator questions to find the real 
woman, is a better test for intelligence. Dennett 
(2004) does not see Turing committing himself to 
such a view, that for a machine to think it has to think 
“just like a human being – any more than he was 
committing himself to the view that for a man to 
think, he must think exactly like a woman” (p.270). 
Sterrett (2000) advocates female impersonation 
asserting that the original imitation game is the 
stronger test for machine intelligence. Unlike 
Turing’s intention, in Sterrett’s test the man’s 
performance is central to the imitation game. Sterrett 
justifies her view from an early Turing statement 
(1950: p.434):  
“what will happen when a machine takes 
the part of A [the man] in this game? Will 
the interrogator decide wrongly as often 
when the game is played like this as he 
does when the game is played between a 
man and a woman”?  
Sterrett suggests the machine’s intelligence can be 
measured “by comparing the frequency with which it 
succeeds in causing the interrogator to make the 
wrong identification [that it is a woman] with the 
frequency with which a man does so” (2000: p.83). 
Sterrett’s test would have the interrogator kept in the 
dark about the real point of the game, i.e., to find the 
machine, instead be tasked to uncover the real 
woman. However it might occur to a participant, 
convened for an experiment involving interrogation, 
that a machine might be present in one of the pairs. 
Piccinini (2000) points out, “if Turing meant the 
interrogator to ignore the real purpose of the game 
why didn’t he say so?” (p.113).  
Sterrett contrasts the double human-pair original 
game with what she refers to as the standard Turing 
test - another term for Genova’s species test: pitting a 
machine against a hidden human with the interrogator 
questioning both to discern the natural from the 
artificial. Sterrett compares the interrogator 
attempting to distinguish between a man and a 
woman, when faced with two pairs of hidden entities 
- man-woman / machine-woman with the machine-
human scenario, writing that “one need only pause to 
consider the quantitative results each [original game 
and standard test] can yield” (2000: p. 83). However 
in actual results realised from practical Turing test 
experiments, without imitating a woman machines 
have been misclassified as human (Shah & Warwick, 
forthcoming; Warwick & Shah, 2015; Warwick & 
Shah, 2014abc; Shah & Warwick, 2010). 
Sterrett asserts the man pretending to be a woman 
would have to “critically edit” because he cannot 
change his gender enforcing “self-conscious 
critiques” of his natural “trained responses”. To 
Sterrett, the man’s performance would provide a 
human benchmark for the machine that furnishes 
“value as a test for intelligence” (2000: p. 90). But 
what of individuals like Caitlyn Jenner, once Bruce 
Jenner the male athlete who won gold in the 1976 
Summer Olympics and now a female modelling for 
Vanity Fair’s front cover (2015)? What are natural 
trained responses for transgenders? 
2.3.2 Self-Identity & Stereotypes 
Sterrett concedes she is feeding into stereotypes. 
She does not clarify how or why impersonating a 
woman is a better test for intelligence than responding 
satisfactorily to any questions. Sterrett’s test for the 
‘best female impersonator’ between a mechanical 
transvestite (Hayes & Ford, 1995), and the man 
impersonating a woman, could be easier for married 
men, Indian Hijras and transgenders. Sterrett 
simplifies and reduces gender to the binary and the 
confines the interrogation to ‘topics of interest to 
women’. This restricts machine development to 
systems that simulate a man impersonating a woman. 
Gender is more complex than division into socially 
acceptable norms of ‘male’ and ‘female’. As Clarey 
 (2009) points out “humans like categories neat, but 
nature is a slob”. Dreger (2010) shows that there 
needs to be clarification of the distinction between sex 
and gender. Sex is a “conglomeration of anatomical 
and physiological features that differ between typical 
females and males ... what your body is about” 
whereas gender is “who you are ... self identity”. To 
Dreger, “gender role refers to your social identity” (p. 
22).  Hence when something as complex as gender is 
so muddled and not clear-cut, Sterrett’s statement 
“setting the task of cross gendering one’s responses is 
a stroke of genius” (2000: p. 91) is too simple. 
Stereotypical views are held by some 
interrogators in practical Turing tests: a female 
cybernetics undergraduate participating as a human 
foil for a machine was misclassified as a male, an 
instance of gender blur (see Shah and Warwick, 
forthcoming). The assumption is clear: males are 
more likely to study certain subjects at university than 
females. However, in that same experiment, a human 
control duo test embedded among machine-human 
pairs, the interrogator wrongly classified the male 
human as a female. In other practical Turing tests 
Eugene Goostman machine, developed to imitate a 
male child, was classified as a human female (Shah 
and Warwick, forthcoming), while Elbot virtual robot 
bereft of human characteristics was classified as a 
male professor (Shah and Warwick, forthcoming; 
Shah and Warwick, 2010). 
3 STRENTHENING TURING’S 
TEST 
Purtill (1971) felt it might be fun to “program the 
[imitation] game and try it on a group of students” (p. 
291). The authors have conducted 5-min duration 
public Turing test experiments   involving male and 
female students and non-students, experts and non-
experts (Warwick and Shah, 2015; Warwick and 
Shah, 2014abc; Shah et al., 2012; Shah and Warwick, 
2010). Interrogators were asked to identify hidden 
interlocutors as:  
 Machine, human or unsure? 
 If human: 
o Male or female? 
o Age range: child, teen, adult? 
o Native or non-native English 
speaker? 
One focus of ongoing analysis, from over 400 
practical Turing tests involving more than 80 
interrogators and 6 machines, is how often 
interrogators assigned hidden interlocutors, human 
and machine, as male or female.  
Gender no longer plays a central part in Turing’s 
test once the digital machine is introduced (1950: p. 
446). To strengthen the test, the authors suggest 
removing the ‘unsure’ option used in previous 
experiments (Warwick and Shah, 2014c) and direct 
the tests with the following adapted conditions: 
 Increasing interrogation period every 
few years; 
 Ask interrogators to classify hidden 
interlocutors as either machine, human 
male, or human female. 
In this way machine progress can be regularly 
evaluated advancing artificial conversational 
performance. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The crux of Turing’s game is the machine’s 
intellectual capacity to respond satisfactorily to 
unrestricted questions put by male or female 
interrogators. The authors oppose the idea that the 
machine in a Turing test should imitate a man 
pretending to be a woman, because it restricts the 
machine-human comparison test to a dependency on 
stereotypical female-male views on societal roles. 
Nonetheless gender concerns should be incorporated 
in the development of AI. More research is needed to 
find if embodied carers and companions or virtual 
assistants are accepted more as genderless, or with 
female or male, including as part of future healthcare.  
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